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Game theory and port economics: a survey of recent 
research 
 
Abstract 
The last decade has seen a significant upsurge of studies seeking to examine the impacts of 
port agents’ strategic decisions. The outcome has been a wide range of results and 
conclusions. The aim of this work is to provide a review of this recent research in the port 
industry that uses strategic interaction approaches from industrial organization and game 
theory. The paper concentrates on five topics: ownership, relationship between ports and 
their hinterlands, port authorities and port operators’ relations, capacity investment 
decisions and port specialization. We present the objectives, methodologies and results of 
the papers reviewed, with special emphasis on how models are developed. The results are 
not always consistent between the works analyzed. On the one hand, this could be due to 
the complexity of the port industry and the high number of agents that intervene. 
Researchers need to simplify reality to build their models by imposing restrictive 
assumptions. On the other hand, results could be very sensitive to the techniques used or 
to the differences on the port environment of the countries of study. However, some 
conclusions can be extracted and they present a good starting point to develop more 
sophisticated models. Finally, we also propose avenues for future research. 
Keywords: ports, game theory, industrial organization, transportation. 
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1. Introduction 
Globalization, the growth of international trade and the relocation of the main centers of 
production and consumption have resulted in the need to create new more reliable and 
efficient supply chains, providing new opportunities for shipping lines, terminals, and other 
transport operators. These logistic models are continuously evolving. Consequently, transport 
firms have had to re-evaluate the scope of their activities in response to structural changes in 
logistics (Kaselimi et al. 2011). Ports are the main elements of many of these supply chains 
because of their position as gateways or/and transshipment centers. As a result, ports have 
become complex centers where many of the main functions within the supply chains are 
developed. 
Technological developments in the port industry, such as containerization or improvements in 
communication systems, have reduced transport cost and times, improving schedule 
reliability. Moreover, the rising importance in international trade of emerging economies, such 
as China or the countries of Southeast Asia, whose exports represented approximately 35% of 
global exports in 2010 (European Central Bank, Emerging Economies), have intensely increased 
demand for port services and competition between ports. These new developments and trade 
by ports, which are losing their monopolistic position over the hinterlands because they 
increasingly overlap with one another have enlarged the reach of markets served. This growth 
of cargo movements and competition has been accompanied by a wave of privatization 
through devolution policies around the world which has stimulated further inter-port and 
intra-port competition. 
These new developments and trends which occurred in the last fifty years have attracted much 
scholarly attention. This has resulted in an increase in port studies which have led to scope a 
wide branch of issues and methodologies. We can find empirical or/and theoretical analysis 
that use different approaches depending on the analyzed issue (frontier models, descriptive 
and cluster analysis, principal component analysis, game theory, industrial organization…). 
Otherwise, the most common studied issues in port literature are the following ones: terminal 
operators, ports in supply chains, port governance, port planning and development, port policy 
and regulation, port competition and competitiveness, spatial analysis of sea ports, port 
selection, productivity and efficiency, and cooperation, merging and alliances. For an extended 
review of port studies, see Chang and Lee (2007) and Pallis et al. (2011). 
Game theory allows us to study most of the issues mentioned above from a strategic point of 
view. It makes it possible to theoretically analyze the effects of port management decisions 
such as investments, price policies, and ownership on profits, on social welfare and on the 
competitive position of ports. This information represents a useful decision tool for policy 
makers, managers, and other agents. Due to these advantages, in recent decades, great 
progress has been made in the application of game theory to transportation analysis, with 
research in the airport sector the first to apply this approach in the early 1970s (Levine, 1969 
and Carlin and Park, 1970). Since then, the air sector has been widely and successfully analyzed 
using strategic interaction approaches. However, with the exception of the studies of Yang 
(1995, 1996, 1998 and 1999) in the late 90s, it was not until the last decade that game theory 
was applied widely to port sector analysis.  
Therefore, with this study, we seek to provide a survey of recent research that applies game 
theory approaches to the port industry to outline the topics discussed, methodologies used 
and results obtained. Due to the scope of the field, we focus on those studies exclusively 
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related to governments, port managers and terminal operators, so we abstract away from 
other agents related with port activities such as shipping lines, truck companies… We expect 
this survey to be a useful guide for future research in this field and, at the same time, useful 
for port managers or policy makers in shaping their decision processes differently. 
The paper is organized by topic as follows. Section 2 surveys works that analyze the effects of 
port ownership. Section 3 focuses on studies that relate ports with their hinterlands. Section 4 
analyzes port relations and integration processes in the port industry. Section 5 reviews papers 
that study the strategic investment decisions in capacity. Section 6 reviews port specialization. 
Finally, conclusions are presented in section 7. 
 
2. Ownership effects and competition 
The governance of ports has changed dramatically since the 1980s. As a result, private 
operation of port facilities is increasingly common, particularly government devolution 
programs. We can understand devolution as “the transfer of functions or responsibility for the 
delivery of programs and services from the federal government to another entity” (Rodal and 
Mulder, 1993). Devolution leads ports around the world to move away from a public 
management model to other methods of organization, such as mixed forms of ownership 
and/or management models that combines public and private participation in port activities, 
with the landlord port model one of the most popular options. Although reform objectives 
vary, the main reasons discussed are the following: first, private port operation is considered 
possibly more cost and technically efficient (Tongzon and Heng, 2005); second, private 
ownership may raise the competitive position of a port (Midoro et al., 2005); third, there might 
also be strategic reasons, with governments opting for privatization to increase port profits as 
part of the national welfare (Czerny et al. 2014). Moreover, Brooks (2004) notes that 
increasing deficit, accumulated debt burdens and low levels of public confidence in 
government could force governments to find ways to do more with fewer resources. Finally, 
Xiao et al. (2012) add reducing bureaucracy and public investment as other reasons for 
devolution. However, does devolution actually have these effects? 
In this section, we review the literature on strategic choice of ownership of port facilities. The 
studies of Czerny et al. (2014), Matsushima and Takauchi (2014) and Xiao et al. (2012) analyze 
the effects of ownership on port charges1, investment, profits and welfare in a competitive 
environment. Figure 1 shows the model structure used in the papers of Czerny et al. (2014) 
and Matsushima and Takauchi (2014). The main differences between these papers are, on the 
one hand, that Czerny et al. (2014) and Matsushima and Takauchi (2014) only consider private 
or public owned ports, whereas Xiao et al. (2012) include scenarios with partially privatized 
ports because real world experiences suggest that after port privatization, in many cases, 
governments maintain a certain degree of influence on port operation or strategic investment 
decisions. On the other hand, Xiao et al. (2012), unlike Czerny et al. (2014) and Matsushima 
and Takauchi (2014), do not analyze the decision whether to privatize ports, focusing only on 
the effects of ownership, considering ownership strategies exogenous. These studies are 
summarized in table 1. To do so, Xiao et al. (2012) propose an integrated economic model in 
which the effects of different forms of ownership on port charges and capacity investment are 
analyzed. Moreover, these authors consider the case of either monopoly or oligopoly. This 
model is based on a one-stage game where the owners of port facilities simultaneously decide 
port charges, capacities and quantities that maximize the objective function that depends on 
the form of ownership (Figure 2). 
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Figure 1: Model structure of Czerny et al. (2014) versus Matsushima and Takauchi (2014) 
 
Source: Czerny et al. 2014 and Matsushima and Takauchi 2014 
 
Figure 2: Objective function of the different forms of ownership (Xiao et al., 2012) 
Port manager Objective function 
Private firm Maximization of port profits 
Local government 
Maximization of local profits  
(port profit + spillovers to the local 
economy) 
Central government 
Maximization of social welfare 
(port profit + spillovers to the local 
economy + consumer surplus) 
 
Source: Xiao et al. (2012) 
The methodology used by Czerny el al. (2014) differs from that used by Xiao et al. (2012). 
Czerny et al. (2014) consider two ports belonging to two different regions. These ports are 
competing, and each regional government must decide whether to privatize the facility in its 
region. A two-stage game is modeled; in the first stage, governments make the privatization 
decision simultaneously to maximize the regional welfare measured as the sum of net benefit 
of local consumers and port’s profit; in the second stage, they set port charges that maximize 
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ports’ objective functions. By comparing the results of all possible scenarios in the second 
stage, the ownership is determined taking into account rival ports’ behavior. Furthermore, a 
third region is included in their model, with both ports competing for transshipment traffic. In 
this way, port demand function is obtained by applying the Hotelling model, including the 
three regions. 
Matsushima and Takauchi’s (2014) model is similar to that of Czerny et al. (2014), except that 
these authors neither include a transshipment market nor obtain port demand from the 
Hotelling model, but do apply a reciprocal dumping model. Their model comprises of two 
countries, with each containing a port and a firm that serves the two markets; therefore, in 
each country, there are two homogeneous firms competing. When a firm exports, it must use 
both ports, incurring a transportation cost composed of the shipping price and the port 
charges. Finally, public owned ports set port charges to maximize national welfare, while 
private owned ports to maximize their profits. In this paper, national welfare consists on 
consumer surplus, port’s profit and local firm’s profit. An important assumption is that ports 
cannot discriminate between firms regarding port charges. A three-stage game is developed: 
in the first stage, governments decide independently whether to privatize their ports; 
secondly, ports independently set their port charges; and thirdly, the two firms simultaneously 
compete in quantity in both markets. They analyze equilibrium outcomes under different 
assumptions: homogeneous market size, heterogeneous market size, and, the case in which 
ports engage in cost reduction activities after the ownership structure is determined. 
Xiao et al. (2012) and Czerny et al. (2014) find that private owned ports set higher port charges 
than public owned ones. Furthermore, Czerny et al. (2014) show that strategic 
complementarity in pricing decisions occurs when both ports are privately operated. This 
complementarity leads to greater exploitation of the transshipment market but reduces 
consumer surplus in the national market, which could be compensated with higher port 
profits. Therefore, if the transshipment market is sufficiently large, then the incentives to 
privatize both ports are strong. In contrast, Matsushima and Takauchi’s (2014) model shows 
that public owned ports can set higher port charges than private owned ones when transport 
costs are high to protect the domestic firm. These port charges are strategic substitutes 
independent of port ownership. These authors find that, in equilibrium, both ports choose the 
same ownership strategy.  Despite using quite similar models, the results obtained by Czerny 
et al. (2014) and Matsushima and Takauchi (2014) are conflicting. This would indicate that 
their results depend heavily on the demand functions. 
Regarding investment decision and congestion, Xiao et al. (2012) find that the larger the share 
of private ownership is, the less the capacity investment is. When a local government is 
involved, the greater spillover effects a higher capacity investment. These investments are 
higher when ports are coordinated by a central government than when these ports compete. 
This result cannot be generalized due to the fact that many governments face severe 
budgetary constraints which do not allow them to undertake certain investments that may be 
necessary. To conclude, the authors find that fully private and partially private ports present 
the same level of congestion, which is lower than ports managed by a central government. The 
first result could not be in line with practice. This could be because of two issues. First, the 
objective functions of private port managers and local governments only differ in the inclusion 
of spillover effects (figure 2). Second, differences in the operational efficiency between private 
and public management are not considered to measure congestion. 
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Although these authors take into account that congestion depends on port operations, 
capacity and operation efficiency, they do not allow differences in efficiency according to the 
various types of ownership in ports. However, in practice, private and public owned ports 
could not present the same levels of efficiency (Cheon et al. 2010). In general terms, the only 
difference considered between private and public-owned ports in these studies is their 
objective function. However, this implicit assumption could generate biased results. As we 
previously mentioned, it is considered that private firms could be more efficient than public 
ones due to their capacity to control costs. This fact is related with the concept of X efficiency 
(Leibenstein, 1966). In this sense, those firms with more competitive pressures manage to 
operate at lower costs which can lead to increases in labor productivity and savings associated 
to the use of inputs which in turn affects the firms’ profits.  
Finally, an interesting future research area would be the study of the effects of the different 
types of port ownerships on the strategies of vertical relations between infrastructure and port 
services.  
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Table 1: Summary of ownership effects and competition 
Study Objective Forms of ownership Methodology Results 
Czerny et al. 
2014 
Analyzing the decision 
whether to private ports 
 Ports fully public 
 Ports fully privatized 
Two-stage game: 
 
1. First stage: ports decide simultaneously 
whether to privatize, maximizing social 
welfare 
2. Ports set port charges competing in 
price 
Private ports set higher port charges. 
A reduction of consumers’ operational cost implies higher 
port charges, ceteris paribus. 
If transshipment market size is large enough, privatizing 
both ports will achieve Nash equilibrium. 
Matusushima 
and Takauchi. 
2014 
Analyzing the decision 
whether to privatize 
ports 
 Ports fully public 
 Ports fully privatized 
Three-stage game: 
 
1. Governments decide simultaneously 
whether to privatize, maximizing social 
welfare 
2. Governments set port charges 
3. Firms compete following a reciprocal 
dumping. 
Strategic privatization decision depends on transportation 
costs. 
All possible equilibrium ownership outcomes are 
symmetrical. 
The government of the largest country has strong 
incentives to nationalize its port. 
Xiao et al. 2012 Analyzing the effects of 
port ownership 
 Ports fully public 
 Ports fully privatized  
 Partnership between: 
o Public (local or central) 
ownership 
o Private ownership. 
Given that objective function depends on 
the form of ownership: 
 
Ports simultaneously set port charges, 
output and capacity (in competitive 
environments taking into account 
competitors’ behavior) 
The greater private investor control is, the less capacity 
investment is. 
A greater spillover effect implies higher capacity 
investment. 
Ownership does not affect congestion when competition 
does not exist. However, if there are competing ports, 
owned by a central government, then they will present 
higher levels of congestion 
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3. Relations between ports and hinterlands 
Containerization and devolution have intensified port competition, dramatically increasing the 
movement of cargo; consequently, many ports and their respective hinterland infrastructures 
around the world, especially hinterland road systems, are increasingly congested (Yuen et al., 
2008). Additionally, the nature of port competition has changed over recent decades from a 
competitive structure involving individual ports or shipping companies to one implicating full 
maritime logistic chains (Suykens and Van de Voorde, 1998). Therefore, the port is just one 
node in any particular supply chain, and its attractiveness depends not only on its own 
infrastructure or performance but also on other factors related to the logistic chain to which it 
belongs. According to Van de Voorde and Vanelslander (2009), a maritime logistic chain 
consists of three sections: the purely maritime activities, the handling of goods in the port, and 
the hinterland transport services. Thus, the distribution within the hinterland is an important 
element of the competitive strength of a port. In this way, if we consider a port a node of a 
logistic chain, improving not only port but also hinterland accessibility, then the delay costs of 
using that port will be reduced and its competitiveness improved.  
These facts have motivated several studies to seek to theoretically analyze the effect of 
hinterland conditions on port performance, demand and profits. In this group, we find the 
papers of De Borger et al. (2008), Zhang (2008), Wan and Zhang (2013) and Basso et al. (2013). 
These studies are summarized in table 2. The first three studies are similar in methodology and 
objectives. All investigate the impact of hinterland access conditions on port competition, 
considering a congestible hinterland. The main differences among them are the following 
ones: first, De Borger et al. (2008) consider congestible port facilities, analyzing the effects of 
the capacity investment decision on port and hinterland. Second, Wan and Zhang (2013) 
abstract away port congestion, while road tolls are considered endogenous variables; 
therefore, both hinterland capacity and road tolls are set by governments in a first stage. 
Third, Zhang (2008) separately represent hinterland access infrastructures, dividing them into 
those specifically for sea cargo and those used by both freight trucks and local commuter cars. 
Figure 3 shows the model structures used in the papers of De Borger et al. (2008), Zhang 
(2008) and Wan and Zhang (2013). These three studies propose a two-stage game for two 
competing ports located in different countries. In the first stage, governments decide the 
optimal capacity levels of facilities and road tolls that maximize the social welfare of their 
respective countries, taking into account the ports’ pricing behavior. Then, in the second stage, 
privately operated ports set port charges, taking into account potential congestion at facilities. 
Nash equilibrium port charges are set by a price competition model in the case of Borger et al. 
(2008); in contrast, Wan and Zhang (2013) assume that ports compete in quantity, whereas 
Zhang (2008) considers the possibility of both price and quantity competition. 
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Figure 3: Model structure of Borger et al. (2008), Zhang (2008) and Wan and Zhang 
(2013). 
 
Regarding the results, Borger et al. (2008) find that investment in port capacity induces both 
ports to reduce port charges. However, improving hinterland accessibility raises demand and 
congestion; therefore, it increases the port charges of the port that uses this infrastructure but 
reduces competitors' port charges. A similar result is achieved by Zhang (2008) but only in the 
case of the specific facility for sea cargo. Thus, Borger et al. (2008) conclude that governments 
have stronger incentives to invest in hinterland than in port capacity, increasing capacity until 
the marginal profits of those increments equal the unit cost of that capacity. However, Zhang 
(2008) finds that when ports compete in quantity, investments in the sea cargo-specific 
corridor of one port increases the output and profits of that port and reduces competitor 
output, while investments in roads have an undetermined effect.
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Table 2: Summary of relations between ports and hinterlands. 
Study Objective Model structure Methodology Results 
Borger et al. 
2008 
Modeling the optimal 
decisions regarding 
investment in port facilities 
and hinterland accessibility. 
 Two congestible ports competing 
 A common hinterland 
 A congestible road used by hinterland's 
commuter traffic. 
Two-stage game: 
1. Governments simultaneously decide 
ports’ and hinterlands’ capacity, 
maximizing social welfare. 
2. Ports set port charges competing in price 
Investment in port capacity reduces port 
charges. 
Investment in hinterland accessibility increases 
port charges of its port and reduces those of 
rival ports. 
Zhang 2008 Investigating the effects of 
hinterland accessibility on port 
competition linking port 
competition with urban 
mobility. 
 Two ports competing 
 A common hinterland 
 Two congestible facilities, one road used 
by commuter traffic and the other only 
used by port traffic. 
Two-stage game: 
1. Governments simultaneously decide on 
road and corridor facility capacity, 
maximizing social welfare. 
2. Ports set port charges competing in price 
and quantity 
Investment in port corridor capacity increases 
port charges of its port and reduces those of 
rival port. 
Investment in road capacity has an 
undetermined effect.  
 
Wan and 
Zhang 2013 
Developing a model to analyze 
rivalry between alternative 
intermodal transportation 
chains. 
 Two ports competing 
 A common hinterland 
 A congestible road used by hinterland's 
commuter traffic. 
Two-stage game: 
1. Governments simultaneously decide on 
hinterland capacity and road tolls, 
maximizing social welfare. 
2. Ports set port charges competing in 
quantity. 
Investment in road capacity, increases port 
charges, demand and profits (with the 
opposite effect on the rival port). 
 
Basso et al. 
2013 
Investigating strategic 
investment decisions. 
 Three independent governments, three 
regions, two with a port and a common 
hinterland. 
 Port regions compete for the 
transshipment traffic of the third. 
 Any combination of coalitions between 
governments is possible. 
Two-stage game: 
1. Governments simultaneously decide on 
capacity of accessible facilities under 
different forms of coalition. 
2. Ports set port charges competing in price 
that maximize their regions' social 
welfare. 
(Port demand is obtained by Hotelling's 
model) 
Coalition between port regions implies less 
investment in these regions than no coalition. 
Coalition between one port region and the 
third region implies higher level of investment 
than coalition between port regions. 
Coalition among three regions implies higher 
investment in port regions and lower 
investment in the third region than non-
cooperation. 
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Wan and Zhang (2013) find that road capacity investment increases a port’s output, port charges 
and profits, having the opposite effect on its rival, reducing road congestion in both chains and 
creating a positive externality across both regions. The effects of road tolls on port competition 
depend on the toll’s mechanism. First, with discriminative tolls, an increase in commuter tolls has 
the same effect as road capacity on output, port charges, profits and congestion. In contrast, a 
decrease in truck tolls raises output, charges, profits, and road congestion, causing the opposite 
effect on its competitor’s logistic chain. Second, an increase in non-discriminative tolls has the same 
effect as capacity investment if and only if the difference between the delay cost to shippers and 
commuters is sufficiently small. 
On the other hand, Basso et al. (2013) also study this topic, although from a different point of view. 
They consider two seaports with their respective captive markets and a common hinterland for 
which the seaports compete. The two seaports and the common hinterland belong to three 
independent local governments, which determine the level of investment in their own regional 
transportation systems in the first stage of the game. When governments invest four scenarios are 
considered. In the first, there is no cooperation among governments. The other three scenarios 
present three different forms of coalition: a coalition between the port regions’ governments, a 
coalition between a port region government and the common hinterland government and finally, a 
coalition among the three regions’ governments. In the second stage of the game, public owned 
ports set port charges that maximize national welfare taking into account their competitors' 
behavior. Basso et al. (2013) show the following results. On the one hand, improving the 
infrastructure of a region with a port reduces its port charges and profits, increases its consumer 
surplus, and also reduces competitors' charges, although to a lesser extent. Meanwhile, investment 
in the common hinterland leads ports to set lower port charges, which makes the port with the 
lower charges and better accessibility more attractive, increasing its demand. However, the effect 
on profits is undetermined because the incomes are reduced due to the lower port charges. In 
contrast, the welfare of the other port is reduced. On the other hand, by analyzing the different 
types of cooperation among governments, the authors conclude that coalitions between port 
regions lead to lower levels of investment than in cases of non-cooperation and cooperation 
between the common hinterland government and a port region government. Otherwise, 
cooperation among the three governments leads to higher levels of investment in port regions and 
lower levels in the common hinterland region than in the case of non-cooperation. The net effect 
on the welfare of total cooperation is positive, increasing in the common hinterland region and 
decreasing in the port regions. 
Studies analyzed in this section set the optimal level of hinterland and/or port infrastructure. From 
their results, it can be seen that investment in one region´s facilities affects port profits and welfare 
of the neighbor region. So, we could expect some type of reaction from governments to neighbor’s 
investment in order to reduce its negative effects on port profits and social welfare, especially 
when ports are competing. So, the optimal level of capacity could depend on the rival’s capacity, as 
there is a strategic interdependence among regions’ investments. Including this type of response 
could make the model more general and complete. 
Finally, in line with these studies, it would be interesting to analyze inter-port competition with the 
same hinterland. Currently many regions have several ports competing and these ports have to 
share the same infrastructures. Furthermore, this analysis could lead to study the circumstances 
under which these ports located in the same region would prefer to cooperate instead of 
competing. 
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4. Port authorities and terminal operators: vertical relations and horizontal integration 
processes 
Devolution has amplified private participation in port operations, leading ports to pursue vertical 
separation of pure port services. As a result, in most cases, port authorities maintain management 
of port infrastructures, with private companies providing the remaining services. This new 
framework has expanded the number of players in port operations, such as port authorities, 
terminal operators, shipping liners, and transport companies, leading to new types of relations 
among these entities. In this way, we find two clearly differentiated trends in port systems around 
the world. The first is a well-known trend that began in the mid-1980s; in that trend, a global wave 
of port privatization was caused mainly by the need for private financing of infrastructure and 
revamping of port operations to address an increasingly competitive environment (Midoro et al. 
2005), which led ports to vertically separate many port services. The second is a new and growing 
trend featuring new forms of partnership among private port agents (Soppé et al. 2009). Several 
studies use game theory to explain these new relations and their effects. Some analyze the vertical 
relations between port authorities and terminal operators, while others focus on the new 
partnerships between private operators. 
4.1. Vertical relations between port authorities and private operators 
Due to governments around the world have stimulated the participation of private companies in 
port services, especially in the ownership and operation of port terminals, Van Reeven (2010) has 
developed a model to analyze the effect of intra-port competition on economic sea rents. His 
model includes two competing ports, each managed by a port authority. In this context, Van 
Reeven (2010) assumes that these ports could be either integrated ports or landlord ports. This 
assumption leads to three possible scenarios: two landlord ports competing, two integrated ports 
competing, and finally, a landlord port competing with an integrated port. In a landlord port, 
several private terminal operators compete in the port and set prices, and the port authorities set 
their port charges simultaneously, taking into account occurrences in the competitor port. In 
contrast, in an integrated port, all activities are conducted by the port authority, which sets its port 
charges taking into account the competitors’ behavior. In that way, the model has the following 
structure: first, port authorities decide whether to allow private participation in port services; and 
second, port authorities and terminal operators simultaneously set port charges and prices, 
respectively, by competing in quantity. In this way, it would be interesting to model this second 
stage as a leader-follower game, i.e., firstly, port authorities set port charges, and then terminal 
operators choose prices taking port charges as given. Finally, ports’ demands are obtained by a 
Hotelling model. Comparing the results of these scenarios, Van Reeven (2010) finds that being a 
landlord port is a Nash equilibrium. Private participation in port operation raises port charges and 
profits in the entire sector because port charges are strategic complements. Finally, if the number 
of private terminal operators tends to infinity, then the profits of a landlord port are equal to those 
of an integrated port. Therefore, the port industry has no incentive to introduce intra-port 
competition because the lesser number of private terminal operators competing in a port, the 
higher profits for that port. 
Following with an analysis of the effects of intra-port competition, Kaselimi et al. (2011) examine 
how dedication of existing terminal capacity for exclusive use by a specific customer or group of 
customers affects the prices and profits of both port authorities and terminal operators. They use a 
model similar to that of Van Reeven (2010). Again, there are two competing ports managed by their 
respective port authorities. In each port, there are several terminal operators. From a linear 
Hotelling model with fixed localization at the extremes, they obtain ports’ demands and develop a 
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one-stage quantity-price game. Using this model, they compare the results obtained analytically in 
the two possible scenarios: with and without a dedicated terminal2. Dedicating an existing terminal 
in a port implies that a percentage of the demand of this port goes only to the dedicated terminal, 
and the rest is satisfied by the multi-user terminal providers. On the other hand, the number of 
competing terminals is reduced because one has become dedicated. To test the model, Kaselimi et 
al. (2011) carry out a numerical simulation collecting data based on estimations for the ports of 
Antwerp and Rotterdam in the Rhine-Schelt Delta for the year 2007. These authors find that 
dedication of a terminal will lead to lower profits for the port authority because, in this model, 
profits represent only those coming from the multi-user terminals. Measuring port authority’s 
profits from a dedicated terminal would allow these authors to determine the circumstances under 
which port authorities have incentives to dedicate existing capacity. This analysis might complete 
the model. Moreover, under the assumption that the capacity dedicated is higher than demand 
extracted from multi-user terminals, the numerical simulation shows that multi-user operators are 
able to keep a substantial portion of the demand in their port and still increase their profits. 
Therefore, they are not negatively affected by the introduction of a dedicated terminal. Finally, the 
users of multi-user terminals always lose when an existing terminal is dedicated because terminal 
operators increase their prices, and congestion problems can appear. 
Yu and Shan (2013), in contrast, abstract away intra-port competition, focusing on inter-port 
competition and vertical relations between governments and private terminal operators, allowing 
for the possibility of horizontal integration between terminal operators. Again, they model a 
framework of two ports competing for container traffic, with one terminal operator located in each 
port. This model includes both competition between ports or governments and between the two 
terminal operators. Furthermore, as stated earlier, these authors consider different terminal 
competition intensities: in one scenario, these terminals are operated by two different companies, 
and in the other, they are operated by the same company. For this purpose, a three-stage game is 
modeled. In the first stage, port authorities set port charges that maximize their profits. In the 
second, port operators determine the quality of their services to maximize their profits; if private 
operators own the same company, then the quality is determined in a centralized way. Finally, 
private operators set their prices with the aim of maximizing profits again. This game is solved by 
backwards induction. Furthermore, from a Hotelling model in which ports are not located in the 
extremes existing dedicated demand, port demands are derived for the analysis. A numerical 
simulation is then carried out to test the model. In practice, when two terminal operators are 
managed by the same company, strategic decisions such as quality and prices are usually made in a 
centralized way. Therefore, an interesting option could be that in the third stage of the game, 
terminal operators set prices in order to maximize the joint profit when centralized management 
was considered. The main results suggest that governments’ profits are lower when two terminals 
are centralized. Therefore, governments prefer that port terminals compete rather than centralize. 
In contrast, if one terminal has relatively fewer advantages in its service quality than the other, it 
will prefer service centralization because it can share the relative advantages of the other terminal. 
The above works study the relations between port authorities and port terminals; however, none 
analyzes the bases of the agreements or concessions that allow private firms to conduct port 
operations. Wang and Pallis (2014) study post-contractual moral hazard problems with port 
concession agreements, Yip et al. (2014) analyze the effects of competition on these agreements 
and Saeed and Larsen (2010) focus on the inverse effects, i.e., the concession agreements’ effects 
on inter-port and intra-port competition. 
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Wang and Pallis (2014) develop a game theory framework to identify post-contractual moral hazard 
problems and analyze fixed lump-sum fees and performance-based fees as solutions by which Port 
Authorities' interests are aligned with those of terminal operators. To do so, they model one 
terminal operator that has private information about its influence on the quantity of handled cargo, 
which greatly affects the port authority’s welfare. This quantity of services depends positively on 
the terminal operator management effort, which implies a cost for the private operator. Regarding 
fees, on the one hand, if the concession agreement is awarded for a fixed fee, then the terminal 
operator must pay in the first year of the concession. Moreover, a minimum throughput guarantee 
is imposed by the port authority; if this guarantee is not satisfied, then the awarded concession will 
terminate. From this assumption, the researchers compare the actual value of the terminal 
operator's profits from fulfilling the concession agreement with the case in which the terminal 
operator prefers to raise its prices during some period, providing fewer services than those agreed 
upon and breaking the concession contract. On the other hand, if the concession agreement is 
awarded for a performance-based concession fee, then the greater the throughput volume handled 
by the terminal operator in one period is, the lower the concession fee charged by the port 
authority in the next period will be. The reduction of the concession fee could be seen as an implicit 
subsidy for the terminal operator's efforts. The researchers again compare the flow of profits when 
the terminal operator makes an effort to increase the throughput volume with the case in which 
the terminal operator only seeks to increase its own profits in a given portion of the concession 
period. From this analysis, they obtain the following results. On the one hand, if the demand faced 
by the terminal operator is relatively inelastic—for example, there is no close substitute available to 
port users—then the terminal operator tends to make no effort to improve quality and charge 
higher prices. Moreover, in the case of fixed lump-sum fees, a great market interest, short 
concession periods, and an unusually large one-time gain from cheating could lead a port terminal 
to break the concession contract earlier. Therefore, a fixed lump-sum concession fee is less efficient 
in combating the moral hazard problem. Finally, when performance-based fees are introduced, if 
the terminal operator is cheating, the opportunity cost is not only the future profit that the 
operator could have earned but also the deduction of concession fees over the subsequent periods. 
Consequently, this type of fee could be presented as a solution to the moral hazard problem. As the 
authors only consider a monopolistic framework, other factors such as competitive pressures are 
not taken into account as tools that could help to avoid or reduce moral hazard problems. 
In contrast, to analyze the effect of competition on port concession agreements, Yip et al. (2014) 
study two ports competing in services that are close but imperfect substitutes and in which two 
private operators are applying for concession rights. The authors propound a two-stage game. In 
the first stage, each port must award its two terminals to one terminal operator, another terminal 
operator or both. Each port chooses the strategy that maximizes its profits which are a share of the 
terminals profit. Ports take rival’s strategy into account, leading to four possible scenarios. In the 
first, each port is served by the two terminal operators. In the second, while each port is served by 
only one operator, these operators differ from the ports. Third, both ports are served by the same 
terminal operator. Finally, one port is served by one terminal operator and the other by both 
terminal operators. In the second stage, the terminal operators engage in a Cournot competition in 
each possible scenario. By comparing the equilibrium profits in each scenario, the best strategy for 
each port can be obtained. The problem is that these outcomes depend on many factors, so 
conclusions cannot be obtained straightforwardly. Despite this, they achieve the following 
conclusions. First, for a terminal operator, it is always preferable to monopolize the four terminals. 
Second, port authorities have incentives to introduce intra-port or inter-port competition only if 
their share of the terminal’s revenues is large. Authors consider the share of revenues charged by 
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ports as an exogenous parameter instead of a decision variable of port managers, this fact might 
have led to this unintuitive or confused result. Third, when ports are symmetrical but not perfect 
substitutes, every symmetrical outcome between ports could be a Nash equilibrium depending on 
such factors as the size of port demands, demand substitutability, and the proportion of revenues 
shared by the ports. When the results of a model depend on a branch of heterogeneous factors, a 
numeric simulation could be helpful to understand the model and to achieve additional results. 
Saeed and Larsen (2010) analyze the effects of differentiated concession agreements on 
competition in three ports located in Pakistan (Karachi port, Port Muchammad Bin Qasin and 
Gwadar Port). In Karachi Port, there are three terminals, one public owned and the others operated 
by private companies. The concession conditions in this port for the private operators are not the 
same; unless both pay a fixed fee per TEU handled and an annual lease, the quantities are different. 
In the other two ports, there is only one terminal operator; additionally, Gwandar Port is new, and 
the concession conditions are not public. From a Bertrand oligopoly model, the authors obtained 
the Nash equilibrium prices and profits of the terminal operators in these ports (not including 
Gwandar port). Once the Nash equilibrium outcomes are obtained, the model is solved by a 
numerical simulation. To do this, authors use available information and the values of some 
parameters are assumed on the basis of previous studies. When the value of certain parameters 
are assumed, it would be desirable to test different values for these parameters in order to check 
the robustness of the results. Then, they compare the results of the present situation (concession 
contract with fixed fee differentiated by terminal) with two hypothetical scenarios in which the 
Karachi port authority does not discriminate between the two private terminal operators, with the 
same profits as in the real case. In the first scenario, the port authority sets the same fixed fee per 
TEU for both private operators, and in the second, the same percentage fee. Moreover, the gains in 
the users’ surplus in the hypothetical cases from the real case are obtained applying the rule of the 
half3. The authors find that the profits of predominantly private companies located in Karachi port 
are lower with non-discriminatory fees than in the initial case. Nash equilibrium prices with a non-
discriminatory contract are higher in the fixed fee than in the percentage fee, with users better off 
with the non-discriminatory percentage fee. 
Finally, Zheng and Negenborn (2014) analyze and compare vertical relations between government 
and port operators through two port regulation modes, centralization and decentralization. In the 
centralization model, government selects a port operator to manage port operations, designs the 
contract and receives all revenues, transferring a payment to the port operator. The central 
government requests cost information from the port operator to design the contract. So the 
contract is based on the port operator’s report. Problems arise from the different objective 
functions of the agents and information asymmetries, which lead the authors to apply principal-
agent theory. Thus, the solution implies the central government designs a contract that maximizes 
social welfare, subject to the maximization of the port operator’s profits only if the port operator 
reports truthful information, with profits being larger than in the case of cheating. Otherwise, 
decentralization mode is modeled as a Stackelberg game in which the local government plays the 
role of the leader, while the private port operator acts as a follower, competing with government’s 
terminal in the port operators market. Authors assume that local government owns all relevant 
information about the port terminals’ performance. Local governments are likely to have had more 
information about private terminals’ performance than central government, even more if local 
government operates a public owned terminal, but even in this case, in practice, information 
asymmetries still occur between public and private agents. Moreover, the authors assume that 
private owned terminals are more cost-efficient than public owned ones. In the first stage, the local 
government sets the capacities of the public and private owned terminals. In the second stage, the 
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local government and private operator set prices and efficiency levels playing a simultaneous 
duopoly game. This model is applied to container terminals in the Port of Shanghai, with the most 
important results as follows: decentralization reduces prices, and raises port efficiency, demand, 
and social welfare. The impact of different regulation modes on capacity and operators' profit is 
uncertain. 
These studies investigating vertical relations are summarized in table 3. 
4.2. Horizontal relations between private port companies 
In this subsection, we reference works that analyze horizontal integration processes. 
Containerization and globalization of the world economy have encouraged the development of 
horizontal concentration or coalitions of port terminal operators. We can distinguish two cases: 
integration of private port operators that form part of a global port operator (for example, DP 
World which owns 46 port terminals over six continents or the equivalent) or coalitions or mergers 
that take place in the same port to gain market share, achieve better utilization of combined 
capacity and/or use partners’ storage facilities (Saeed and Larsen, 2010). The latter has been 
studied empirically and theoretically by Reynaerts (2010) and Saeed and Larsen (2010), 
respectively. The first paper specifically analyzes the case of Hessenatie and NoordNatie, two 
private operators that carried out a merger in 2001, located in the port of Antwerp (Belgium). In 
the second paper, Saeed and Larsen analyze the possibility of coalitions among three terminals in 
Karachi port (Pakistan). Because we are surveying those works that apply game theory to the port 
industry, we focus on the latter. 
Figure 4: Horizontal integration processes in port terminal industry 
 
As stated, Saeed and Larsen (2010) analyze the decision of three terminal operators regarding 
whether to join a coalition, with one belonging to the port authority. Moreover, this port competes 
with another port in which there is only one terminal. In all coalition forms, the signatories decide 
cooperatively what prices to set and how to use their combined capacity to maximize the coalition 
surplus. Otherwise, coalitions and singletons compete in a non-cooperative way. For this purpose, 
they develop a two-stage game in which the market share of each terminal is derived by an 
aggregate multinomial logit model and demand for all the terminals is a function of the logsum4 
from the logit model. In this game, first, the three terminals located in the same port decide in a 
non-cooperative way whether to join the coalition; this decision depends on the payoffs of the 
second stage, in which the terminals (signatories and singletons) compete in price. To do so, the 
game is solved by backwards induction. Therefore, the authors first derive reaction functions of the 
four terminals for the benchmark (no coalition) and all possible coalition scenarios. Then, with the 
available data, they solve the system of equation that forms the model in each scenario to obtain 
the prices’ Nash equilibrium. From these prices, they obtain the equilibrium market shares, user 
costs, and profits. From the equilibrium profits, the authors test the stability of the different 
coalitions through the concepts of characteristic function and core5. The stability analysis shows 
that there is a stable coalition; this is the grand coalition in which the three terminals obtain better 
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payoffs than through any other coalition or being a singleton. Thus, in the first stage, the players 
should join the grand coalition. Authors have not considered how this grand coalition affects port 
authorities. If we assume that the port authorities are public owned, their objectives are likely to 
come into conflict with those of private owned terminals. For example, a public owned port 
authority cares about social welfare and the grand coalition raises prices and reduces demand 
shares, so consumer surplus is negatively affected. Thus, it would be interesting to analyze how 
coalitions affect the objectives of port authorities. Besides, it would be expected that port 
authorities react to coalitions when they set port fees or via the concession agreements. The study 
by Saeed and Larsen (2010) is summarized in table 4. 
Some papers analyzed in this section consider that ports or port authorities share a part of private 
terminals revenues by a percentage fee. This assumption could be realistic when private owned 
ports are studied, but maybe not in the case of public owned port authorities. Sharing port 
terminals’ revenue could degenerate the port authority’s task of regulating prices to protect the 
public interest by linking private profits to public ones. Moreover, in practice, when ports charge 
private terminals a fee for the use of the infrastructure, it is usually a fixed sum fee (World Bank, 
2007) instead of sharing terminal profits. So, in the case of public owned port authorities, this 
assumption seems not to be quite realistic or go in line with the general practices. 
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Table 3: Summary of port authorities and terminal operators: vertical relations and horizontal integration processes 
 Objective Relation and players Methodology Results 
Van Reeven 
2010 
Analyzing the effect of intra-
port competition on economic 
sea rents 
 Integrated versus landlord ports 
 Two ports competing 
 N private terminal operators in each port 
 Intra-port competition 
Two-stage game: 
1. Port authorities choose whether 
ports are integrated or landlord 
ports 
2. Authorities and private operators 
simultaneously set port charges and 
private prices competing in quantity. 
Being a landlord port is a Nash Equilibrium. 
If the number of private operators in each port 
tends to infinity, then port authorities’ profits 
are the same in both landlord and integrated 
ports. 
Kaselimi et 
al. 2011 
Investigating the effects of a 
dedicated terminal on inter- 
and intra-port competition. 
 Vertical relation 
 Two ports competing 
 N and K terminal operators in each port 
 Intra-port competition. 
One-stage quantity-price game: 
Authorities and private operators 
simultaneously set port charges and 
private prices competing in quantity. 
Multi-user terminals are not negatively affected 
by the introduction of a dedicated terminal. The 
users of multi-user terminals always lose: prices 
and congestion increase. 
Yu and Shan 
2013 
Analyzing inter-port 
competition and vertical 
relations between port 
authority and terminal 
operators 
 Vertical relation 
 Two ports competing 
 One terminal operator in each port 
 Different terminal competition 
Three-stage game: 
1. Port authorities set port charges. 
2. Terminal operators determine 
service quality centrally or 
separately. 
3. Terminal operators set their prices 
separately. 
Port authorities’ profits are lower when terminal 
operators are centralized. 
A terminal with a disadvantage in service quality 
would prefer to operate in a centralized way. 
Wang and 
Pallis 2014 
Providing a game theory 
foundation for concession 
agreements between port 
authorities and private 
operators. 
 Vertical relation (concession 
agreements) 
 One port authority 
 One private operator 
 
Comparing flows of profits resulting from 
cheating in the concession agreement in 
a determined period with profits 
obtained if the agreement is fulfilled. 
If port demand is inelastic, then terminal 
operators put less effort into increasing 
throughputs. 
A fixed lump concession is less effective than a 
performance-based fee, which could be 
presented as a solution to a moral hazard 
problem. 
Yip et al. 
2014 
Analyzing the effects of 
competition on terminal 
concession agreements. 
 Vertical relation (concession 
agreements) 
 Two ports  
 Two private operators. 
 
Two-stage game: 
1. Both ports decide which private 
operator is awarded each of their 
terminals. 
2. Terminal operators competing in 
quantity. 
Terminal operators prefer to monopolize all 
terminals. 
Ports prefer to introduce intra- and inter-port 
competition when the share of terminals’ 
revenues that they obtain is sufficiently large. 
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Table 3 (cont): Summary of port authorities and terminal operators: vertical relations and horizontal integration processes 
     
Study Objective  Relation and players Methodology Results 
Saeed and 
Larsen 2010 
Analyzing the effects of 
concession agreements on 
competition. 
 Vertical relation (concession 
agreements) 
 Three ports in Pakistan. 
 Five port terminals (three located in 
Karachi port with different concession 
conditions) 
One-stage game: Bertrand competition 
between terminals in different 
concession agreement scenarios.  
With non-discriminatory fees, the overall profits 
of terminals located in Karachi are lower than 
with discriminatory fees. 
Users are better off with non-discriminatory 
percentage fees. 
 
Zheng and 
Negenborn 
2014 
Comparing centralization and 
decentralization port 
regulation modes 
 Vertical relation 
 Centralization mode: 
o Central government 
o Private port operator 
 Decentralization mode: 
o Local government 
o Private port operator 
 
Centralization mode: principal-agent 
methodology. 
 
Decentralization mode: two-stage game. 
1. Local government sets capacities 
2. Local government and private 
operator set prices and efficiency 
levels. 
Higher operational costs of port operator and/or 
greater proportion of operator’s profits from 
governments’ objective function have different 
effects depending on the port regulation mode. 
Centralization mode implies higher prices and 
lower port efficiency, demand and social welfare. 
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5. Port capacity investment 
A critical strategy for governments is the choice of port capacity. Port capacity expansion can 
reduce marginal cost in the presence of economies of scale in output and congestion. 
However, poor planning of capacity development can lead to misallocation of resources and 
loss of economic efficiency. In the critical economic situation currently affecting countries 
around the world, the development of efficient expansion strategies for ports is highly 
relevant, especially to justify public funding for these projects (Dekker and Verhaeghe, 2008). 
However, the opposite appears to be occurring in most ports. Ports around the world present 
overcapacity. Haralambides (2002) identifies such issues as economies of scale in port 
construction, capital indivisibilities, and port as an instrument of regional development, 
managerial "ego-boosting" and overly optimistic demand forecast as causes of overcapacity. 
Other authors note other factors, for example Luo et al. (2012) consider overcapacity as a 
reliability signal, using capacity investment as a preemptive policy to maintain or gain cargo 
traffic. 
Models such as those developed by De Borger et al. (2008) and Xiao et al. (2010) seek to 
determine theoretically the optimal levels of port capacity that maximize the different 
objective functions of governments. These works are explained briefly to avoid repetition 
because they are described above. The first work models a two-stage game including 
investment in hinterland accessibility, and the second one uses a one-stage game in which 
ports simultaneously decide output, port charges and capacity considering different forms of 
ownership. These papers show that, on the one hand, greater private share in port ownership 
implies less capacity investment, while for a local government, higher spillover effect leads to 
higher optimal investment levels. On the other hand, they show that higher capacity 
investment increases the demand of that port, which invests reducing the demand of its 
competitor and port charges in both ports. 
Luo et al. (2012) and Anderson et al. (2008) seek to explain the capacity investment process of 
two competitor ports in East Asia. In both papers, the process is first modeled, and then real 
data are applied to explain the model. The objective of these works is to assess whether the 
relevant governments should invest by comparing different investment scenarios. Luo et al. 
(2012) analyze pricing and capacity expansion as preemptive strategies. Whereas Anderson et 
al. (2008) only focus on capacity expansion as a strategy to defend or capture market share.  
Luo et al. (2012) define a two-stage game. First, the government decides whether capacity 
expansion is carried out, assuming that a single government controls both ports because they 
are located in the same region. Moreover, capacity expansion occurs to the same extent in 
both ports, and it is common knowledge. Capacity expansion will be carried out only if the gain 
from the expansion exceeds its annualized capital cost. This gain depends on the competitor’s 
capacity decision. Consequently, two possible gains from expansion may occur, on the one 
hand, when competitors do not invest and, on the other hand, when competitors invest. This 
leads to four decision rules, collected in figure 5, and sixteen possible scenarios. Each scenario 
could have one equilibrium, several equilibriums or no equilibrium. To check these scenarios, 
the authors carry out a numerical test. In the second stage, the ports compete following a 
Bertrand model with differentiated goods, taking into account the results obtained in the first 
stage and the competitors' strategy. The results obtained are the following. Firstly, a 
preemptive port charge under the equilibrium one is not credible. Secondly, higher port charge 
sensitivity and/or lower costs of the new port make the monopolist’s preemptive port charge 
less effective. Thirdly, authors find that higher demand and market share increase the 
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probability of capacity expansion, while a higher price sensitivity of the competitor has the 
opposite effect. Lastly, ports with higher costs, ceteris paribus, are more likely to invest in 
capacity to reduce their congestion cost. Once the model is defined, it is applied to the real 
case of competition between Hong Kong port and Shenzhen port. The investment decisions of 
these ports are coordinated by the government; however, private operators set prices. 
Applying real data, they find that Hong Kong (the incumbent port) cannot use the equilibrium 
preemptive price to prevent Shenzhen increasing its market share. Furthermore, Hong Kong 
should not expand its capacity, while Shenzhen should do so only if Hong Kong does not. 
Therefore, the authors conclude that when a new port has strong competitive advantages, 
pricing and capacity expansion preemptions are not effective. In that way, the best strategy for 
the former monopolist port is to increase its competitiveness.  
 
Figure 5: Investment decision rules of each port 
 
Source: Luo et al. (2012) 
In the same line, Anderson et al. (2009) analyze how competitor ports will respond to the 
development of a port’s additional capacity and whether this port will be able to capture or 
defend its market share. Although the aim of the work of Anderson et al. (2009) is similar to 
that realized by Luo et al. (2012), the methodology is different because the authors abstract 
away the pricing game due to the lack of information. So, they focus on the development 
game given observed or projected port charges. However, this fact does not eliminate the 
need for estimation of port demand because demand is needed to generate payoffs for 
different investment scenarios. Demand curve is built by using available data on Busan and 
Shanghai ports. In the capacity game, ports must decide whether to invest in infrastructure to 
attract more traffic or not. Thus, four possibilities are compared in different investment 
scenarios: neither port invest, both ports invest, only Shanghai invests, and only Busan invests. 
From profits generated by demand prediction, the model shows the investment best response 
strategy to competitor's strategy. As Luo et al. (2012), they consider the amount and cost of 
investment the same for both ports and common knowledge. The results suggest that it would 
be costly and unprofitable for Busan to seek to recover all its transshipment cargo lost to 
Shanghai’s low-cost Yangshan terminal. In this way, development efforts should focus on 
traffic in which a significant competitive difference exists between the ports, i.e., those 
markets that are less vulnerable to capture by a rival with a lower-cost operation. 
To the best of our knowledge, these studies are the first ones that take into account rivals 
investment strategies when a port decides to expand its capacity. The shortcoming of these 
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models is that they impose a homogeneous capacity expansion for both ports. This assumption 
could not be realistic. Moreover, in both papers, strategic interdependence in setting capacity 
is analyzed in a discrete way. The works described above consider investment decisions as 
static choices. However, investment could be seen as a dynamic game because building extra 
port capacity requires long periods of time. This fact is taken into account by Ishii et al. (2013). 
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Table 4: Summary of horizontal integration processes. 
Study Objective Model structure Methodology Results 
Saeed and 
Larsen 2010 
Analyzing different coalitions 
among terminals located in 
Karachi port. 
 Two ports compete, with three 
terminal operators. 
 Joining a coalition means that 
terminals choose prices maximizing 
the joint profit of the coalition. 
Two-stage game: 
1. Terminals of Karachi port decide 
whether to join coalition or not. 
2. Signatories compete in price in a non-
cooperative way 
 
Only the grand coalition (among the three 
terminals of Karachi port) is stable, obtaining 
better payoffs than in a any other strategy. 
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Although these authors do not specifically analyze investment decisions, they propose a model 
that allows the analysis of port charges in the timing of port capacity investment under inter-
port competition and demand uncertainty. This model is applied to the real case of 
competition between Busan and Kobe ports. To do so, they consider a fixed finite time that is 
divided into different periods with varying lengths. At the beginning of those periods, port 
charges and capacity investment decisions take place. The authors assume that there is a 
leader port as the first mover in terms of capacity that invests in the odd periods, while the 
follower port expands its capacity in the even periods. Moreover, timing and levels of 
expansion are common knowledge. Otherwise, the authors assume that demand function 
fluctuates stochastically and port capacity expansion reduces external cost. Finally, it is 
assumed that ports reset their charges at the beginning of each period simultaneously, with 
port pricing behavior expressed by a jump process because it depends on capacity expansion, 
which is also a jump process. Therefore, each port sets charges at the beginning of a period to 
maximize the expected sum of discounted profits for this period where port profits depend on 
competitor behavior. Once all these assumptions are included in the model, the authors obtain 
the best response functions and derive the unique Nash equilibrium charges, obtaining some 
propositions. Finally, these propositions are applied to the inter-port competition case of 
Busan and Kobe. It would be interesting to include capacity as a decision variable of ports. As 
authors explain “it is important for each port to determine levels of port charges and port 
capacity from the viewpoint of port competition”. Although this work is the only one in this 
survey that considers the dynamic nature of capacity expansions, capacity is not considered as 
a decision variable. The main findings of this work are summarized in the following 
propositions. If the average sum of surplus of consumers with the maximum willingness to pay 
is positive, then lower elasticity demands and higher capacity in both ports cause a decrease in 
the equilibrium port charges. In contrast, a long period between capacity investments 
increases Nash equilibrium charges. Data seem to confirm the first proposition. In the case of 
the second, data show that the proper action for Kobe port, likely to maintain its higher 
ranking, would have been to reduce port charges notwithstanding the length of capacity 
investment timing. 
Table 5 summarizes these works related to port capacity. 
 
6. Government intervention and specialization 
Zhuang et al. (2013) propose port specialization as a possible solution to port overcapacity and 
excessive competition in port services. The main question for these authors is how 
specialization can be introduced and whether governments should intervene. Therefore, they 
build a model to investigate the factors or market conditions that affect port specialization. 
This paper is summarized in table 6. Their model features two competing ports that must 
decide which cargo to handle. There are only two types of cargo in the port industry, and ports 
can choose one or both types of cargo. Moreover, two different ways of competing in quantity 
are considered: Stackelberg and simultaneous. Due to ports’ choices, different competitive 
scenarios can occur. Consequently, equilibrium prices, quantities and profits in all are obtained 
for comparison. In order to build a general analytical framework, authors just consider as 
determinants of specialization: market demand, the degree of substitutability between ports, 
and ports’ costs. Other factors such as historical development paths, geographical differences, 
and productive specialization of the port hinterland or their current position in the market 
have not been taken into account in this model, but it should be modeled when a specific 
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market is analyzed. They find that when the market size is sufficiently large, there is a clear 
advantage in terms of profit for the first mover. The authors note that this result can explain 
the aggressive port expansion in the Chinese port industry, with port investors believing that 
these investments can give them a competitive advantage. Another result shows that if a port 
faces moderate relative demand for a cargo, it does not provide this service under Stackelberg 
competition. Finally, port specialization is only possible in the following cases: firstly, natural 
specialization, which occurs when each port has a high relative demand for a different type of 
cargo; secondly, first-mover specialization, where if the follower port has a high relative 
demand for one cargo, it specializes in that cargo; and thirdly, specialization due to excess 
capacity, which could require government intervention. 
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Table 5: Summary of investment decisions 
Study Objective Model structure Methodology Results 
Luo et al. 
2012 
Assessing whether preemptive 
prices and investment could 
work as entry barriers. 
 Two competing heterogeneous ports 
(monopolist versus new port) 
 Investment is the same for both ports 
and common knowledge. 
Two-stage game: 
1. Ports decide whether to expand their 
capacity. 
2. Ports set charges competing in prices. 
Preemptive port charge and investment are 
not effective when the entrant port has high 
competitive strength. 
Anderson et 
al. 2008 
Evaluating capacity expansion 
as strategy to defend or 
capture market share of Busan 
and Shanghai ports. 
 Two ports competing 
 Investment scenarios: 
o To reduce turnaround times 
o In additional gantry cranes 
o In port terminals 
One-stage game: 
1. From estimated demand curve and 
observed port charges, authors simulate 
different types of investment in port 
capacity and its effect on profits taking 
into account competitor's strategy. 
It is not profitable for Busan to defend all the 
transshipment cargoes it has lost to Shanghai. 
Busan should focus its efforts on markets that 
are less vulnerable to capture by Shanghai. 
Ishii et al. 
2013 
Developing a model to analyze 
port charges in the timing of 
port capacity investment 
under inter-port competition. 
 Two ports competing. 
 Fixed time of investment divided in 
heterogeneous periods. 
 At the beginning of each period, port 
charges are set simultaneously, and 
investment takes place. 
 Leader port invests in odd periods, 
follower in even ones. 
One-stage game: 
1. Port charges are set simultaneously at 
the beginning of each period, obtaining 
the best response functions and the 
Nash equilibrium port charges. 
Whether the average sum of surplus of 
consumers with the maximum willingness to 
pay is positive, lower elasticity demands 
and/or higher capacity in both ports implies 
lower port charges. 
The longer the period between capacity 
investments is, the higher port charges are. 
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Table 6: Summary of port specialization. 
Study Objective Model structure Variables Methodology Results 
Tan et al. 
2013 
Analyzing factors and 
market conditions 
behind specialization 
decisions. 
 Two ports competing 
 Two types of cargo in that 
port industry. 
 Stackelberg and Cournot 
competing scenarios are 
considered. 
 
 Prices 
 Quantities  
 Elasticities. 
 Total cost of each type of 
cargo: 
o Marginal cost 
o Fixed cost 
One-stage game. In each 
scenario, ports choose quantities 
that maximize their profits. 
Moving first is always preferred. 
Specializations depend on relative 
demand for each type of cargo. 
Natural specialization, first-mover 
specialization and specialization due 
to excess capacity are the cases in 
which specialization is possible. 
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7. Conclusions and future research 
In this survey we have reviewed a collection of studies which use game theory approaches to 
analyze port competition and the strategies behind port managerial decisions. Port ownership, 
capacity investments, alliances, pricing or regulation are some of the topics that governments, 
port managers or terminal operators have to face. In this sense, the models presented in this 
survey have some policy and managerial implications related to them. 
Notwithstanding, the main results of these models can be summarized as follow. 
Containerization and privatization have led to increased cargo movements and competition. 
Then, the study of optimal levels of port capacity has become a pivotal issue in port 
management. In this way, the models analyzed show that different forms of port ownership 
imply different levels of capacity investment. Capacity investment could not be a good strategy 
when competitors have high competitive strength. Moreover, hinterland infrastructures 
investment affects port strategies, and specialization could be a solution to overcapacity. 
Turning to devolution programs, they have introduced private operators in port activities. We 
have learnt that there may be a discrepancy between the welfare-optimal and private port 
participation. However, these models, with the exception of Zheng and Negenborn (2014), do 
not have taken into account the potential gains in efficiency associated to private operation. 
Moreover, as remark Zhang and Czerny (2012) for the case of airports, these results can 
change when port concession revenues exist. In fact, a deeper understanding on how port 
concession revenues may change previous results should be desirable. On the other hand, if 
we consider the existence of asymmetric information among the different port agents, a 
performance-based fee could be a solution to the moral hazard problem.  
However, in spite of game theory could be a useful tool to study the strategic decisions and 
interactions in port industry, it presents some shortcomings. On the one hand, the high 
number of port agents that participate in port activities complicates the application of game 
theory to the port sector. So, in order to simplify reality to develop a model, these models may 
not collect the complexity of all factors of the sector. In this sense, it would be useful to test 
empirically the theoretical models. This would yield stronger insights about port agents’ 
performance. However, this would require the availability of statistical interactions in port 
industry, it presents some shortcomings. On other hand, given that the use of game theory 
applied to the analysis of port economics is quite recent, there is no consensus about the way 
to model port competition. In this sense, each contribution to the literature presents a 
different way to pose the problem. A clear example is the development of port demand 
functions, which differs from one study to another, despite being determinant on model 
results. In this way, the results are not always consistent between the works analyzed because 
of the techniques used or the differences on the port environment of the countries of study. A 
stronger debate on the appropriate assumptions and more careful attention to the port’s 
institutional specifics is highly desirable. Therefore, results from such theoretical models 
should be taken with the appropriate caution. In this sense, much more work is necessary to 
achieve a unified methodology which allows connecting the different models or issues 
analyzed. 
Finally, future research should include the robustness of the main results from theoretical 
models using different specifications for port demand and congestion functions, port’s 
institutional specifics and the empirical application of the models. Other new lines of research 
could be: (1) the analysis of investment decisions when competing ports share the same 
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hinterland infrastructures, (2) the study of the effects of different forms of ownership 
considering vertical separation of port services, (3) a deeper analysis of non-price inter port 
competition, (4) the study of vertical relationships under a two side network6 framework 
(Rochet and Tirole, 2003).  
Notes
1 To achieve more homogeneity in concepts, we use port charge to refer to the amount of 
money charged by ports or port authorities against a ship or its cargo in port, price to refer to 
the amount of money charged by the terminal operator for handled services and, finally, port 
fee to refer to the amount of money that terminal operators must pay to port authorities for 
port land. When we must talk in general terms, we use the concept of price or pricing. 
2 A dedicated terminal is that port capacity that a port authority dedicates for exclusive use by 
a specific customer or group of customers. 
3 According to ‘the rule of the half’ methodology, a change in user surplus can be estimated as 
a change in the generalized costs multiplied by the average demand before and after the 
formation of a new contract. 
4 The logsum is defined as the log of the sum of the exponential of the port terminals’ utility 
functions. It is a measure of consumer surplus in the context of logit choice models (De Jong et 
al., 2007). 
5 A characteristic function allocates each coalition a real number, called the coalition value. 
This value represents the minimum value that a coalition can obtain when all its members 
cooperate and act like a team. In contrast, the core is a set of imputations under which no 
coalition has a value greater than the sum of its members’ payoffs (Song and Panayides, 2002). 
6 A two side network or market is an economic platform that have to distinct group of users. 
This platforms provide infrastructure and rules that facilitate the two groups’ transactions 
generating a virtuous circle. Providing services to one group of users generate positive 
externalities to the other one (Eisenmann et al., 2006). 
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